









Social Economy Advancement: From Voluntary to Secure Organizational Commitments to Public Benefit

Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explain the development of the social economy in the United Kingdom (UK) by analyzing the establishment in 2005 of a new organizational form for social enterprise - the Community Interest Company (CIC). The CIC is a legal structure designed to permit trading for social purpose and ensure that company assets are committed to community benefit in perpetuity. The establishment of the CIC legal structure was an important historical event, especially in the UK where the previous new organization legal structure was introduced more than 100 years ago (Nicholls, 2010). How new institutions are instantiated is an important aspect of economy and society (Smith and Teasdale, 2012) and an historical lens enriches our understanding of social economy development in the UK. Moreover, we are only just beginning to understand the impacts of new legal structures for social enterprise on social economies in different countries (Gottesman, 2007; Gupta, 2011; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003; Rawhauser et al., 2015; Reiser, 2011, 2013; Smiddy, 2010). The research is guided by the question when, why and how was a new legal structure for social enterprise established in the UK?
The CIC is a new type of trading company in which assets are tied in perpetuity to community benefit and was one of several policy initiatives introduced by New Labour (1997 - 2010) that were designed to support the growth of the social economy (Smith and Teasdale, 2012). While prior social entrepreneurship research published in the JMH advances knowledge of opportunity exploitation (Murphy et al., 2018; Phipps and Prieto, 2018) and types of social enterprise (Sarma, 2019; Stott & Fava, 2020), the analysis presented in this paper focuses on structural diversification of the UK social economy. The paper makes three contributions to management history. The analysis explains, first, the influence of context on the timing of the establishment of a new legal structure for social enterprise and second, how the characteristics of two extant organizational forms were innovated into a novel hybrid legal structure. Further, how the establishment of a new legal structure for social enterprise was achieved by collaboration between practitioners, lawyers, the civil service and politicians.
	The paper is presented as follows: in the next section the historical context of the UK social economy (Amin et al., 2002; Anheier, 2005) and emergence of social enterprise (Boschee, 2001; Emerson and Twersky, 1996; Gottesman, 2007; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003; Smiddy, 2010) are employed to frame the analysis. The methodology and contextual conditions at the time of the CIC legislation are then presented. The development of the CIC from idea to legislative enactment is periodized and structured according to principal actors and activities. The discussion outlines the contributions to management history and implications, and the paper concludes with suggestions for future research.

The UK social economy
The social economy, also referred to as the non-profit sector or third sector, loosely describes the collective of autonomous organizations that generate income to fund the provision of services to members or communities (Alcock, 2010; Haugh and Kitson, 2007; OECD, 2003). Notably, social economy business models prioritize people and employment above capital accumulation and disbursement (Smith and Teasdale, 2012). Situated between, and bridging, the public and private sectors, the social economy accommodates a wide range of organizational forms, e.g., charities, cooperatives, trusts and associations (OECD, 2003). Social economy organizations have a long history of providing social and welfare services in the UK: the Elizabethan Statute of Charitable Uses (1601) defined the meaning of charitable purposes (Anheier, 2005; Dunn and Riley, 2004) and the first cooperative, the Rochdale Society of equitable Pioneers, was established in 1844 (Birchall, 1997). The population of registered non-profit organizations in the UK increased between 1970 (76 648) and 1979 (132 303) (Hilton et al., 2012), and from 2001 (152 696) to 2017-2018 (166 537), peaking in 2007-2008 (171 074) (NCVO, 2020a, Table D6). The increase has been attributed to social and economic trends - the unemployment rate for 16 year olds had risen from 3.6% (1974) to 11.8% (1984) (ONS, 2020) – and the hope was that social economy organizations would “fight against unemployment and social exclusion” (OECD, 2003, p. 15).
	Social economy organizations also have a long tradition of providing social services (Anheier, 2005; Sepulveda, 2015) and in this role “cannot be conceptualised without reference to the state” (Amin et al., 2002, p. ix). To illustrate, of the 166 537 registered charities in the UK (2017-2018), the most important activities are providing social (32 258, 19.3%), cultural and recreation services (24 024, 14.4%) (NCVOa, 2020, Table A6). In comparison to other registered charities, charities that contract to deliver social services earn the highest proportion of income (£11 653.9 million, 21.8%) and incur the greatest expenditure (£11 199.3 million, 21.8%) (NCVOa, 2020, Table A6). When charity total annual income (£53 544.8 million) is analysed by type of income, the largest proportion of earned income (£19 391.4 million) is received from government contracts (£10 531.7 million) (NCVO, 2020a, Table C2). While public donations are consistently the most important income source overall, the second most important source, income from government (contracts and grants), increased from £10 878.6 million (2000-2001) to £15 691.2 million (2017-2018), peaking at £17 123.5 million (2009-2010) (NCVO, 2020a, Table C7). Public sector grants and service delivery contracts are thus important sources of income for social economy organizations.

The emergence of social enterprise
Social enterprises are a relatively recent addition to the social economy. First popularized in the United States (US) (Boschee, 2001; Emerson and Twersky, 1996), social enterprises provide a range of goods and services, typical examples include fair-trade certified products (Nicholls and Opal, 2005) and work integration services (European Commission, 2015). Prior to the CIC legislation, the legal structure adopted by social enterprises in the UK included an Industrial and Provident Society, e.g., either a cooperative or public benefit society legal structure (Birchall, 1997; Galera and Borzaga, 2009); a company limited by guarantee, e.g., some leisure trusts (Sesnan, 2001; Simmons, 2008); or a registered charity, e.g., some housing associations (Czischke et al., 2012; Stott and Fava, 2020). A leisure trust is a non-profit distributing organization that leases publicly-owned sports facilities and receives financial support to make up the difference between trading income and costs (Sesnan, 2001; Simmons, 2004). A housing association is an independent, not for profit organization responsible for developing and managing subsidised rental housing (Czischke et al., 2012; Stott and Fava, 2020) that is eligible to receive by transfer publicly-owned housing stock (Manzi and Morrison, 2018). The defining characteristics of social enterprise are the pursuit of social and environmental mission and the generation of income from trading (Doherty et al., 2014). A social enterprise can be registered as either a for-profit business that makes an explicit contribution to social good, or a non-profit that pursues a social mission and generates income from trading (Galera and Borzaga, 2009; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003; OECD, 2012). Social enterprises demonstrate that trading and social mission are not mutually exclusive (Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003). 
	Scholar and policy maker interest in social enterprise is found internationally. In the US, the L3C (low profit limited liability company) was first introduced in Vermont in 2008 (Gottesman, 2007; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003; Smiddy, 2010). Originally designed to facilitate programme-related investments by US philanthropic foundations, the L3C legal structure permits profit making and social mission to be combined. Open to other sources of finance, such as “other non-profits, trusts, endowments, pension plans, individuals, corporations and governmental entities” (Galpin and Bell, 2010, pp. 29-30), no limit on profit making is set other than that all activities must advance social mission. In 2007 the B Corp (beneficial corporation) organizational form was introduced for companies that trade for social purpose (Gehman et al., 2019; Gupta, 2011; Rawhauser et al., 2015; Reiser, 2011). B corps are designed for profit making companies that devote significant resources to social and environmental mission (Gupta, 2011). Across Europe, new organizational forms for social enterprise were also created, often embedding cooperative organizing principles (Kerlin, 2006), e.g., social cooperatives (Italy), social solidarity cooperatives (Portugal) and cooperative of general interest (France) (European Commission, 2015; OECD, 2012). In other countries however, such as Australia, the growth of the social economy has not been accompanied by the introduction of a new organizational form for social enterprise (Morgan, 2018).

The Community Interest Company
The CIC was one of a raft of policy initiatives introduced by New Labour to stimulate the growth of the social economy (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017). An organization registered as a CIC is prohibited from charity registration and hence ineligible for the taxation privileges of charity registration (Dunn and Riley, 2004). Three alternative CIC governance structures were established (Lloyd, 2010; Nicholls, 2010). First, a company limited by guarantee and without share capital: all members of the CIC have the powers of shareholders except that they own a guarantee in the CIC, usually to the value of £1 to be paid on winding up the company. Second, a private company limited by shares: CIC equity shares are issued privately to investors and subject to a dividend cap (​https:​/​​/​www.communitycompanies.co.uk​/​community-interest-companies" \l "divcap​) to limit disbursement of any surplus to shareholders. In this way, the CIC attracts equity investment as well as reassuring investors, and other stakeholders, that the trading is for community benefit. Finally, a public company limited by shares: CIC shares are advertised for public subscription and the same dividend cap applies as the private CIC limited by shares. CIC compliance is assured through first, registration with Companies House and second, registration with the Office of the Regulator of CIC Companies. The dual registration ensures that a CIC complies with company law, namely, operating in the interests of shareholders and producing accounts and annual returns available on public record. As required by companies, a CIC is required to publicly file its first CIC Report within 21 months of incorporation, and annually thereafter, however, CICs are also required to report on the activities that benefit the community (Cabrelli, 2016; Haugh, 2019). The next section describes the methodology and the findings explain when, why and how the CIC legal structure was established in the UK.

Methodology
The research approach is a single case study (Yin, 2011) and employs data gathered from multiple sources. A single case study is particularly appropriate for investigating novel phenomena and processes (Eisenhardt, 1989) and an historical case study enables connections to be made between context, chronology, continuity and change (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017; Sepulveda, 2015; Tennent, 2020). The aim of the qualitative methodology and inductive approach is thus to describe the structural development of the UK social economy.

Data sources
The principal data sources are documents and qualitative interviews. Fifty three documents were retrieved from the UK National Archive, the official government archive and publisher for England and Wales (https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/) and Hansard, the official report of parliamentary proceedings (https://hansard.parliament.uk/). These government publications, parliamentary papers, submissions to and reports from stakeholder consultations, and the parliamentary debates specifically refer to the CIC. Articles that cited ‘community interest company’ between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 2005 were also retrieved from Factiva (n=161 articles). Accepting that archival source are not neutral (Tennent, 2020) and formal published sources of information present a version of events that is likely to reflect the interests of the source (Bowden, 2019), semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants connected with the establishment of the CIC organizational form. The process of locating the originators of the idea for the CIC took approximately six months and after interviewing the three founders, purposive sampling (Morse, 2010) was employed to identify other informants associated with the establishment of the CIC legal structure. The interviews investigated the informant’s first-hand involvement (Kask and Prenkert, 2018) in establishing the CIC legal structure and provide stories of their actions, beliefs, aspirations and social processes not captured in archival data. Theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1968), the point at which no new information is being discovered, was reached after interviewing social enterprise practitioners (n=5), lawyers (n=4), civil servants (n=9), and politicians (n=3). (The anonymised informants are listed in Appendix, Table AI).

Data analysis
The documents from the UK National Archive, Hansard and Factiva and interview transcripts were uploaded and stored using NVivo software. The principles of grounded theory were then employed to analyze the documents and interview transcripts (Glaser and Strauss, 1968; Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Charmaz, 2014). The analysis was conducted manually in order to stay close to the data (Howorth et al., 2012) and allow the analytical constructs to emerge. A chronological of events was pieced together and then organized into three meaningful periods distinguished by the actor groups responsible for and activities involved in progressing the CIC from idea to legislation – thus placing people, ideas and agency (Bowden, 2020) as the drivers of social economy change. The timeline of events (Langley, 1999) commences with the publication of the Report of the Commission on Social Justice (Centre for Social Justice, 1994) and concludes when the CIC legislation was enacted (OPSI, 2005) (Tables I and II).

Insert Tables I and II about here

Findings
Contextual influences on the origins of the CIC
The UK is reputed to have the most developed institutional infrastructure for social enterprise in the world (Nicholls, 2010), however, the phrase ‘social enterprise’ was not found in UK policy documents or media discourse prior to 1997 when several trends in the 1990s coalesced to create a context conducive to stimulating and supporting more business-like approaches to tackling poverty, inequality and social exclusion. In the context of a broad government consensus that communities and individuals should be more proactive in “solving social problems” (Dey and Teasdale, 2016, p. 489), the trends included increased outsourcing of public service delivery, especially welfare services, from governmental and quasi-governmental organizations to voluntary and community sector organizations (Amin, 2005; Dunn and Riley, 2004; HMT, 2002; Osborne, 1998; Rose, 1996; Sepulveda. 2015) and the allocation of public sector funds to support social and community regeneration and development (Amin, 2005; HMT, 2002; Marshall, 2004; Affleck and Mellor, 2006). In addition, there was also increased competition between non-profit organizations for revenue and financial support (Gottesman, 2007; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003) and rising government and societal interest in encouraging non-profit organizations to be more enterprising and innovative (Dunn and Riley, 2004; Emerson and Twersky, 1996; HMT, 2002). A former Minister for the Third Sector explained:
We see the third sector as having an important place in delivering public services. For social enterprises, their business-like approach is key to transforming public services delivery, as well as contributing to community regeneration. But we also need to change the way these services are commissioned. It is not about transferring service delivery, but transforming it. (SS, politician)

In 1996 the chief executive of a left wing think tank, DEMOS, commissioned an independent author to report the new zeitgeist about trading for public benefit. The Rise of the Social Entrepreneur (Leadbeater, 1997) presented five narratives from people who had devised a financially sustainable business model to deliver healthcare and social services. The narratives described the legal complexities of trading for public benefit and advocated for simplifying the legal structures available to such organizations. The recommendations specified the creation of a “simple, hybrid, deregulated, off-the-shelf legal form” (p. 4) and to locate the responsibility for providing business support to social entrepreneurs in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). This distinction is noteworthy as the DTI was at the time responsible for services to industry whereas the interests of community and voluntary organizations were served by the Department of Communities and Local Government:
The government should embark on an urgent overhaul of corporate law as it applies to these organizations. The legal structures available to social organizations are unnecessarily cumbersome and complex. A starting point would be a review of ownership and legal structures available to social enterprises in Europe. (Leadbeater, 1997, p. 86)

In May 1997 the New Labour government introduced policies for social and economic reform and in Bringing People Together: A National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal created 18 Policy Action Teams (PAT) to devise innovative solutions to the problems of economic decline, unemployment, inequality and deprivation (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998, p. 9). In the same year Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (DTI, 1998) was published in which the government declared its intention to review company law: 
To consider whether company law, partnership law and other legislation which establishes a legal form of business activity together provide an adequate choice of legal vehicle for business at all levels. (DTI, 1998, p. 12)

The first reference to social enterprise in a government publication is in Enterprise and Social Exclusion (HMT, 1999). The report noted the integral role of enterprise in helping government policies designed to regenerate deprived communities and promote neighbourhood renewal, and acknowledged the complexity of existing legal structures for social enterprise (p. 17), recommended a review of legal structures (p. 117), and allocated the responsibility to the DTI for providing support to social enterprises (p. 14). In 2001 the government established the Social Enterprise Unit at the DTI, followed by the publication of Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success (DTI, 2002) in which the intention to review the legal and regulatory framework for social enterprise was declared (p. 35). The outline of a plan for a new type of company for social enterprise was then presented in Private Action Public Benefit (Cabinet Office, 2002).
In practice many non-profit organizations earn profits however, any profits generated are subject to the non-distribution constraint, i.e., the prohibition of the distribution of surpluses to those with an ownership interest in the organization (Hansmann, 1991). Compliance with the non-distribution constraint confers tax exemptions and contribution deductions - these conditions are the cornerstone of legal identity and delineate the boundaries between private and non-profit organizations (Edelman and Suchman, 1997; Hansmann, 1991; Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003). As non-profit organizations are also prohibited from issuing equity, they rely on three principal sources of finance (debt, donations and retained earnings) - sources inadequate for the capital requirements of commercial enterprise (Hansmann, 1991). The CIC legal structure was designed to enable access to equity finance by permitting the issuance of preference shares and, via dividend and interest rate caps, limit the distribution of any surpluses to shareholders (Dunn and Riley, 2004).
The CIC legal structure introduced a new variant of property rights (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Libecap, 1989; Reed, 2004) for companies to trade for public benefit: in essence the principle of community interest is embodied in an asset lock - a type of common property bond that binds in perpetuity the assets to stakeholders beyond organizational members. CIC assets are locked such that they are legally protected irrevocably and in perpetuity for the benefit of the community such that on dissolution of a CIC, any assets remaining after the discharge of debts must be transferred to another asset locked body (Haugh, 2019).
The political opportunity created by the coterminous reviews of company law (DTI, 1998) and charity law (NCVO, 2001) exposed shortcomings in extant organizational forms for the increasing number of organizations that sought to trade for public benefit (Dunn and Riley, 2004). The idea for the CIC legal structure found traction with the prevailing ideology to combine economic prosperity, entrepreneurship and social justice, and provide a mechanism for the further expansion of the community and voluntary sector in the delivery of public services and the regeneration of deprived communities (Dunn and Riley, 2004).

The legislative context, 1994 - 2002
The origin of the CIC legal structure lies in the ideas and actions of two social enterprise practitioners: AA and FF. Both had retired from full time work and were trustees of a large leisure trust (pseudonym Sport) which managed several sports facilities in London. AA had worked in the private and public sectors and BB had been a lawyer. Sport had been successful in winning high value public service contracts and the trustees were therefore responsible for overseeing budgets of several million pounds. Sport’s trustees worked in a voluntary capacity as charity law made their remuneration difficult (but not impossible, see quote below). AA and FF described how the governance challenges faced by Sport were directly linked to constraints arising from its charitable status. 
We were frustrated by the constraints of charity law in recruiting and getting people of the right calibre onto the trustee board. There were a number of different contributors (to the CIC), but one of them was to try and solve this constraint of charitable law that you can’t be a director or chairman of the trustees and receive a salary. At least you can if the trust deed is very clear, but it’s quite difficult and charity law tends against the payment of trustees. (FF, practitioner)

Further, informants explained that the strict definition of charitable purpose limited the kinds of activities that social enterprise could engage in, for example “there are things that the Charity Commission would not consider charitable, but which nevertheless were socially good” (II). The Charity Commission is a non-ministerial government department responsible for registering, monitoring and regulating charities in England and Wales (https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission). Second, AA explained that the relatively higher administration and control costs (when compared to company law requirements) constrained the development of a more entrepreneurial organizational culture at Sport. This meant that it was difficult for Sport to be flexible, innovate and respond to policy developments and market opportunities. The inability to issue equity finance also meant that Sport could not raise or accumulate capital reserves and was therefore seriously under-capitalized and unable to finance expansion and facilities refurbishment.
In September 2001, AA and FF shared their frustrations about managing Sport and drew on their knowledge of company law to sketch out a plan for a new type of company that could solve the problems at Sport. In the next few days, they wrote up the notes in “more legal language” (FF) and invited an associate (GG) to join them in a joint endeavour to advance the idea for a new legal structure for companies to trade for public benefit (Lloyd, 2010-2011). Together they wrote a short pamphlet (4 pages) Growing the Public Sector: New Company Format Essential (PIC Group, 2001a), in which they reviewed the definitions of public and private benefit, and public purpose without charitable status. Calling themselves the Public Interest Company (PIC) Group, the pamphlet summary outlined a new legal structure for public interest trading companies (p. 1). The new organizational form would be regulated under company law, prohibit the disbursement of assets, restrain excessive remuneration of trustees and employees, and embed the rights of citizens to access information, e.g., by open access to all general meetings of members. The pamphlet concluded by proposing 8 amendments to the Companies Acts (pp. 3-4).
	In summary, the “idea was to take company law and inject into it a bit of DNA that made it special for a specific type of company” (Lloyd, 2010, p. 33). The proposals for the PIC legal structure included three aspects from company law (PIC Group, 2001a). First, in the UK private companies fall under the regulatory burden of company law that requires registration with Companies House and the annual submission of a financial performance statement. In comparison to the onerous regulatory burden of charity law (Low and Cowton, 2004), the regime of company law, explained DD, was considered to be “light touch” – a quality deemed desirable for the CIC. Second, private companies can raise money from issuing equity and shareholder liabilities are protected by limited liability. Enabling a CIC to raise equity finance was thus an important clause in the proposal. Finally, trustees of private companies can be remunerated for their time and contribution and therefore the role is more attractive to professionals than volunteering. The aim  of the PIC Group was that these characteristics would enable PICs to emulate the entrepreneurial culture typical of private companies. 
Three benefits of charity law were built into the PIC (PIC Group, 2001a). First, charity law requires that activities are in the interests of advancing public benefit – such activities are listed on the Charity Commission website. Second, the annual check on charitable purpose by the Charity Commission ensures that charities commit and adhere to activities that advance public benefit. The Charity Commission has the authority to remove charitable status, and associated tax concessions, from a charity that fails to adhere to charitable purpose. Finally, when compared to private companies, not for profit companies tend to engage more directly with stakeholders  through participation in governance (Low and Cowton, 2004) The organizational form developed by the PIC Group made provision for requiring organizations to operate in the interests of the public, commit assets to community benefit in perpetuity, and enhance accountability by involving stakeholders in their governance:
The idea behind the PIC, or CIC, was that the assets could not be, well they could obviously be disposed of in the normal course of business, but the funds could not be transmitted to shareholders. (AA, practitioner)

The PIC Group proposal outlined conditions that would ensure that the dis-benefits of charity and company laws would be excluded (PIC Group, 2001a). The comparatively ‘light touch’ regulatory regime of company law confers two advantages on companies that were not considered beneficial to the PIC legal structure. First, companies have flexibility when setting director’s salaries and disbursements. To avoid dispersal of assets in high salaries and benefits, a PIC would be required to disclose executive remuneration in the annual report. Second, the fiduciary responsibility of the management of a company is to act in the interests of shareholders, i.e., those who own equity in the company. This obligation drives companies to engage in activities that may not be in the public interest, such as profit maximization (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). The specification of public benefit as a condition for registration as a PIC meant that the new legal structure was designed to  constrain profit maximisation.
	Similarly, two charity characteristics were excluded from the PIC legal structure (PIC Group, 2001a). In the UK, charitable registration confers generous tax advantages. in exchange for pursuing public benefit and compliance with the strict regulatory regime. The characteristics of the PIC embody the fiscal obligations of companies but do not include the fiscal benefits of charitable status. Second, the close scrutiny of charities’ accounts was replaced by transferring the responsibility for maintaining community interest to the PIC to self-report to a Regulator.
The concept of charity, because it is so rooted in a particular fashion of philanthropy, it has connotations of the wealthy doing good things for the poor. So, a kind of benevolence, and because they felt very strongly that their vision of values was about people in communities fundamentally directing things and doings things for themselves, they did not want to be seen as objects of charity. (BB, practitioner)

After writing the initial pamphlet (PIC Group, 2001a), the PIC Group secured funds from the Charity Law Association to develop the proposals with a view to submission to the consultation on modernising company law (DTI, 2000). The second PIC Group report Public Interest Companies: Report to the Charity Law Association (PIC Group, 2001b) provided more detail about the need for a new legal structure for organizations to trade for public benefit, drafted a memorandum of association for a typical PIC, the amendments to the Companies Act (1985) to establish the PIC, and defined public interest, directors duties, the lock on public assets, action in cases of insolvency, constraints on the remuneration of directors, and procedures for regulation and audit. In response to the announcement of the review of company law, the second PIC Group report was then sent in December 2001 to the Performance and Innovation Unit , essentially a group of civil servants (the practical administrators of government) responsible for carrying out the review of company law:
We’d demonstrated that there was some interest and support in the voluntary and charitable sector for reform of charity law because there was a report from the sector saying that reform was needed. (EE, practitioner)

Insert Table I about here

Debating the CIC, 2003 - 2004
The proposal for the PIC legal structure presented in Public Interest Companies: Report to the Charity Law Association (PIC Group, 2001b) was next developed more thoroughly by the civil servants in the Performance and Innovation Unit. The New Labour regime had focused attention on developing policies to address poverty, inequality and social exclusion. Although the zeal for privatization of the preceding Conservative era had been much criticized by Labour when in opposition, involving local people and voluntary organizations in the delivery of public services appeared to suggest a new way, a Third Way (Giddens, 1998), for reducing the burden of the rising demand for public services on the public sector, and at the same increase the involvement of communities in local regeneration (Amin, 2005; Amin et al., 2002; Rose, 1996). The civil servants changed the name from Public Interest to Community Interest as a way of distancing the new organizational form from any perceived association with the privatization of nationalized industries (Lloyd, 2010), and the widespread belief that widening the options for public service delivery in effect amounted to creating markets for welfare (Amin, 2005; Rose, 1996). However, the need for a new legal structure did not go unchallenged by politicians:
There were big disputes … some people were actually trying to block this happening at all, saying “this won’t be for running public services, it will be just for small things” … others saying “we don’t need to have a CIC at all, we have got something very good in the Industrial and Provident Society Model, and all we need to do is  upgrade that”, and others saying “yes, it is great that we have got that, but actually if we really want lots more people to use it, having a company form is really important”. (DD, practitioner)

The civil servants devised a registration process for the CIC that would be linked to the procedures for registering a private company. Upon satisfying the company registration requirements, a CIC would then be subject to a second round of scrutiny by the Office of the CIC Regulator, a new regulatory process designed to verify community interest claims:
It comes to Companies House in the first instance because they are companies. And so their registration, their INO1, which is the Companies House form, must go to Companies House and the CIC application comes in at the same time. And so the Companies House do their bit and then they copy and send the documents to us. (QQ, civil servant)

Civil servants developed scenarios to present to other practitioners that portrayed the conditions under which the CIC legal structure might be adopted. For example, building societies in the UK are mutual savings institutions that enable individuals to save regularly and then borrow money from the society to finance the purchase an asset, usually a house (Smith and Teasdale, 2012). In the 1990s the majority of UK building societies had de-mutualised and registered as private limited companies and, in the process, issued shares at preferential rates to members. Although this brought windfall benefits to current members, the strategy was much criticised in that members had reaped the benefits of the investments of previous investors (Mayo and Moore, 2002). The CIC asset lock was designed to avoid such an outcome by preventing the disbursement of CIC assets to anyone with a controlling interest. 
The asset lock was done … by prescribing that certain clauses must always appear in the memorandum or articles of the CIC and the asset lock is embedded in those provisions and those provisions are in schedules to the regulations … I suppose there was a degree of novelty about them because it was saying that the  normal approach is that memorandum and articles of a company – that’s the bit that they get to write themselves – by statute are fixed and have to contain those provisions. (HH, lawyer)

Since election, the New Labour government had promoted community organization involvement in local economies. For example, concerns that community organizations were important for community development and how charity law prohibited charitable status for mutual help organizations was first mentioned in the Bringing People Together (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). The PAT teams had comprised multi-stakeholder groups and consulted broadly with people living in deprived areas, practitioners and researchers (e.g., HMT, 1999; Social Exclusion Unit, 1999, 2000a). And the Modern Company Law Review (DTI, 1998) and Private Action, Public Benefit (Cabinet Office, 2002) had required civil servants at the Cabinet Office to reach out to different stakeholder groups and involve them in designing the CIC: 
We have worked by consulting widely, with people living and working in deprived areas, and with practitioners and researchers in fields like finance and business development. (HMT, 1999, p. 1)

The public consultation strategy announced in Enterprise for Communities: Proposals for a Community Interest Company (DTI, 2003c), managed by a newly established Social Enterprise Unit, created 8 multi-stakeholder working groups to examine the needs of social enterprises. To illustrate, the Legal and Regulatory working group investigated extant legal structures. The findings of the working groups fed directly into new government policy. The civil servants also consulted widely with lawyers and practitioners about the legal technicalities of the CIC:
There’s a consultation process, this is what we think we’re going to publish. And then you get the consultation process which is separate from the legislative process. (PP, civil servant)

In 2003 the DTI published a series of CIC working papers: The CIC Regulator (DTI, 2003a); The Community Interest Test (DTI, 2003b); Finance for CICs (DTI, 2003d); and International Comparisons (DTI, 2003e). These publications were designed to present the CIC to practitioners as a ready to adopt legal structure that would reconcile the tensions between trading and public benefit:
They will follow the same incorporation and reporting procedures as other companies and their directors and members will have the same rights and duties. Their special status will arise from some additional statutory requirements. (DTI, 2003b, p. 16)

Compliance with legislation and regulations is managed through a combination of legally enforceable and socially administered sanctions. Legislation adjudged to be unfair may trigger violent civil protest or, particularly for opt-in legislation, ignored. Encoding the rules in line with societal expectations is thus an important task when drafting legislation. The Head of the Policy Unit was acutely aware that for the CIC legislation to progress, the idea had to be ‘sold’ to politicians as they would be responsible for steering and supporting the progression of the new law through Parliamentary debates:
I remember having to go over to pitch these ideas to the Head of the Policy Unit in Number 10. You have to go and pitch your ideas and if (name) didn’t like the ideas … the report could just die, that could just be it. I’m selling something, I’m in selling mode at this moment. I wanted it to go forward … I think that was the moment when CICs happened, persuading (name) that it was going to be big. (JJ, civil servant)
	
Legislating for the CIC, 2003 - 2005
The report Private Action, Public Benefit (Cabinet Office, 2002) had declared the intention of the government to create a new legal structure for social enterprise and signalled the start of a formal public consultation period on this, and other, proposals. In January 2003, the government published the Responses to Private Action, Public Benefit (HMT, 2003). Of 114 comments received, 97 (84%) endorsed the proposals, 10% were negative and 6% were neither for nor against. The intention to then formally consult on the technical aspects of the CIC was announced in Parliament on March 26 when the first detailed proposals were published (DTI, 2003c). In October Enterprise for Communities: Proposals for a Community Interest Company. Report on the Public Consultation and Government’s Conclusions (DTI, 2003f) announced the intention to move to the next stage in which the proposals would be elaborated and legislation drafted. The formal announcement in Parliament stated: 
Our job is to test and improve the new CIC in its passage through the House and, when the Bill is enacted, to add it to the family of different ways to set up social enterprises, cooperatives and community enterprises. (Hansard, 2003b)

In the Queen’s speech (November 2003) the government confirmed the intention to introduce a Parliamentary Bill to create the CIC that would provide a company form for public benefit trading (Hansard, 2003a). The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill (2004) presented the detail of the new legislation and invited comments from interested parties (Hansard, 2003b). An impact assessment of the proposed CIC regulations was published (DTI, 2004b), the Bill debated in Parliament (Hansard, 2004a – 2004i) and a final round of consultation initiated (DTI, 2004b and 2005a). At the same time information documents were published to explain the CIC to practitioners: An Introduction to CICs (DTI, 2004a); The Regulator of CICs (DTI, 2005b); and Forming and Running a CIC (DTI, 2005c). The CIC Regulations SI 1788 came into force in June 2005 (OPSI, 2005).
	For a new law to be enacted, a Green Paper announces the government’s intention to legislate. The Green Paper is presented to Parliament, followed by a White Paper in which the full draft legislation is presented for debate in the Houses of Commons and Lords. Successful passage through the House of Commons rests on an elected MP presenting and defending the Bill, and the same by Lords in the House of Lords. The new legislation in effect needs to be ‘sold’ to both Houses in order to progress into law. The draft CIC legislation was presented to the House of Lords first to increase the speed of the passage of the legislation. The First Reading is a short statement about the new legislation (Hansard, 2003b) and the Second Reading debates the Bill (Hansard, 2004a):
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister who, in opening this debate, paid tribute to … and … for having invented the concept of the community interest company, the CIC. The Bill before us follows substantially the skeleton form that they produced three years ago. It is not often that we are in the business of creating a new corporate vehicle and I think this could be the first entirely new corporate category since the 19th century. So fascinating is the Bill that over the past 24 hours I have managed to miss one train and, on two other occasions, travelled past my intended station—including this morning. It is a riveting read. And a period of around seven minutes is not long enough to cover all I want to say at this stage of our consideration. (Hansard, 2004a)

The report of the Grand Committee on the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Bill was debated in March 2004 during which Lords Glentoran and Philips of Sudbury argued for amendments to the Bill and Lords Sainsbury of Turville and Evans of Temple Guiting defended the Bill (Hansard, 2004b). The debate was held from 15.30 to 19.16 during which time each clause was discussed, 145 amendments accepted, and the Bill finally reported with amendments. A minor amendment relating to CIC reporting was debated and accepted in the House of Lords in July (Hansard, 2004d) and passed to the House of Commons.
	The Bill was then presented to the House of Commons in September 2004 by the Secretary of State for Industry and the Regions and the benefits of legislating for the CIC and support from practitioners extolled to elected politicians:
The community interest company will be a new and additional choice for social enterprises. It is not meant to replace other options such as charities, or the industrial and provident society, which is the form used by many cooperatives. Indeed, the Government are committed to modernizing all legal options used by voluntary and community organizations and helping people to choose their most appropriate option. The special value of the community interest company is that it will offer the flexibility of the company form yet be more suitable for many social enterprises than existing types of companies. Responses to consultations show that there is about 80 per cent. support for the idea of the community interest company, and it is supported by bodies including the Social Enterprise Coalition, the National Council for Voluntary Organizations and the Association of Charitable Foundations. (Hansard, 2004e)

The Bill was debated in the House of Commons in September and October 2004 (Hansard, 2004f and g), amendments agreed (Hansard, 2004h) and then returned to the House of Lords for approval of amendments (Hansard, 2004i). After consultation with civil servants on the draft regulations (DTI, 2004b), the Bill received Royal Assent (Hansard, 2004j) and the Companies (AICE) Act added to the statute book on October 2004 (HMSO, 2004).
	Reflecting on the establishment of the CIC, it was acknowledged that the CIC legal structure had “hit a target exactly … it is just one of the legal options for social enterprise but actually one that really hits the spot” (II, lawyer). Summarising the impact of the CIC legal structure on the social economy:
If you talk to people who run CICs, it’s about commitment to what they’re doing, and a lot of it is about making a statement about what their organization is and having an identity. And they are a family of organizations. They identify with each other and not necessarily with other social enterprises or other businesses. They are CICs. (KK, civil servant)

Since 2005, the CIC has been adopted by more than 15 000 organizations, and as a percentage of social economy organizations, has increased from 10% (2011) to 23% (2019) (NCVO, 2020b). Although approximately 3 000 CICs have ceased trading since registration, a former employee from the Office of the CIC Regulator (QQ) explained that less than ten have been forcibly delisted by the CIC Regulator as, in practice, pre-registration screening weeds out ineligible applications to register a CIC. The legislation to establish the CIC (HMSO, 2004), and the regulatory oversight of the CIC Regulator, thus effectively secure organizational commitments to economic, social and environmental missions.
Insert Table II about here

Discussion and contributions to management history
The establishment of a new legal structure to enable social mission organizations to trade for public benefit was a profound change in the UK social economy (Smith and Teasdale, 2012). Prior to the legislation for the CIC, organizations intent on trading for public benefit were caught in a web in which the regulatory constraints of extant organizational forms held the pursuit of economic and social missions in tension (Doherty et al., 2014). The process of legislating for the CIC built on the efforts of social enterprise practitioners, lawyers, civil servants and politicians collectively, in practice sequentially, striving to achieve the goal of establishing a new organizational form that would permit trading for public benefit. These groups of actors functioned in different occupational and expertise domains and the tasks involved in creating the CIC were transferred between them by persuasion and solution selling.

Contextual influences on UK social economy advancement
The idea for the CIC was grounded in practitioner experiences of the challenges associated with managing a leisure trust. The proposal for the CIC was put forward to civil servants after the founders worked with a lawyer to devise a novel and creative solution to the commercial and governance challenges of organizations that bridge the values and practices of companies and charities. At the same time, the New Labour government introduced welfare reforms to respond to macro level trends of increasing demand for public services, budget constraints and a general spirit of enterprise (Amin et al., 2002; Sepulveda, 2015). The social enterprise practitioners and civil servants initially interact when the practitioners seek to persuade them that the current array of organizational legal structures has not evolved to meet the needs of social mission organizations in the 21st century. 
After the PIC Group sent the more developed proposal (PIC Group, 2001b) to the civil servants in the Performance and Innovation Unit, action proceeded in two ways. First, the civil servants consulted with other practitioners about the need for a new organizational form for social enterprise and sought ideas for its constitution. Second, and at the same time as consulting with practitioners, the civil servants sought to persuade politicians to support legislation for a new organizational form for social enterprise – this was achieved by reporting the positive feedback from consultations with practitioners to the politicians. Persuaded by such reports, the politicians subsequently seek to persuade members of the Houses of Commons and Lords that the CIC legal structure was a necessary advancement and would appeal to, and therefore be adopted by, social entrepreneurs. These arguments were used to progress the legislation through Parliament. The findings thus demonstrate that when extant legal structures have not adapted to contextual change and no longer meet the needs of entrepreneurs, a context is created in which structural change, such as the establishment of a new organizational form, is likely to emerge.

Social enterprise hybrids
Prior to the establishment of the CIC legal structure, organizations seeking to trade for public benefit had to “cobble together business solutions, mixing and matching subsidiaries, joint venture and partnerships” (Gottesman, 2007, p. 344). As non-profit organizations are prohibited from generating income from trading (Hansmann, 1991), commercial activities required establishing a separate legal structure for managing trading income (Lasprogata and Cotten, 2001) A legal structure that enabled trading and social mission accomplishment would confer, at minimum, a cost saving from the requirement to register and report on two organizations. 
	Moreover, the “clouds of confusion and difficulty for investors, managers, creditors, policy makers and regulators” associated with hybrid organizations (Tyler, 2010, p. 118) were addressed in the CIC’s distinct legal structure (Cabrelli, 2016). Although the public benefit principle and asset lock can be built into other legal structures, the dividend cap and limits on interest payments are unique to the CIC (Cabrelli, 2016). In this way the CIC legal structure is a novel hybrid of company and charity characteristics that overcame legal constraints on non-profit organization commercial activity (Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003). 
When compared to charity registration, the CIC is cheaper, simpler and regulatory oversight less onerous (Lloyd, 2010). When compared to company registration, CIC social mission and public benefit are locked in and in turn provide access to resources, such as social finance (Lasprogata and Cotten, 2003), and also communicate social enterprise commitment to ethical values (Nicholls, 2010). The CIC registration and reporting requirements ensure regulatory oversight to maintain such commitments and values. 

A collaborative approach to policy development 
In the historical account presented, social enterprise practitioners, lawyers, civil servants and politicians were committed to creating a new legal structure for organizations that trade for public benefit. The actor groups sequentially press for, and later enact, legislation that overcomes the constraining forces of legislation that has not responded to the changing political, economic and social contextual conditions (Cabinet Office, 2002). The origins of the CIC lay in the needs of practitioners, and extant company and charity laws fostered a pathway from idea generation, technical rule creation to legislation enactment. The agentic capacity of the actor groups was determined by their respective expertise. The sequence of events supports the view that, in order to influence the regulatory process, actors must first bring their ideas for change to the attention of those with the power to bring about change (Demil and Bensédrine, 2005). 
	To gain access to the field of change, and to convince others of the need for change (Fligstein, 1996), actors need to appear to be legitimate. The PIC Group report submitted to the Performance and Innovation Unit outlined the idea and justification for the creation of the PIC. The prior experiences from working with commercial and non-profit organizations conferred on of AA, FF and GG  legitimacy to develop a practical solution; and their prior legal experience strengthened the legitimacy of the PIC Group report with other practitioners and civil servants (PIC, 2001b). The proposal for the PIC was taken up by the civil servants who were then responsible for refining its legal technicalities, consulting and communicating with other practitioners, and persuading politicians to support the draft legislation through both Houses. For these activities, the agency of the PIC Group is attenuated as legitimacy to consult and refine new legislative proposals is held by the civil service. The agency for civil servants is accentuated when consulting with practitioners, and persuading politicians to support the CIC legislation. Agency is then transferred from the civil servants to politicians as they hold legitimacy in Parliamentary debates. The politicians then present and defend the legislation during debates in the Houses of Commons and Lords.
The findings support the view that agency is influenced by the extent to which expertise confers legitimacy to act (Lawrence et al., 2009; Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006) but differ significantly from prior findings that agency rests with the same actors during institutional change (Hargardon and Yellowlees, 2001; Padgett and McLean, 2006). In the analysis of the establishment of the CIC, practitioner agency is accentuated as a source of practical ideas and the legitimacy of the PIC Group is derived from forming a symbolic group and strengthened by securing external funding. As the PIC Group has little agency in the legislative process, other than raising the idea for the PIC, for the CIC legislation to be enacted, agency must be transferred to other actors. While civil servants have less legitimacy as a source of practical ideas when compared to practitioners, they have more legitimacy than practitioners for impartial consulting with stakeholders and drafting and refining legislation. The analysis demonstrates therefore, how agency is not a static quality but is either accentuated or attenuated in relation to actor field level legitimacy. Further, the role of social enterprise practitioners in inventing the CIC legal structure demonstrates how practitioner knowledge and expertise can contribute to policy development and change.
	In common with much management history research, the findings employ the analysis of historical documents. In addition, semi-structured interviews were conducted with informants with direct experience of the establishment of the CIC as it transitioned from an idea through to enactment in legislation. While the published documents present a version of the development pathway of the CIC, the informants provided personal insights into how and why the idea for the CIC emerged, the persuasion and solution selling involved in passing agency between actor groups and how discussion, critique and defending shaped the final legislation. These aspects tend not to appear in formal reports but can be accessed by interviews to render a more holistic account of the social interactions and discourse of management history.

Implications for policy and practice
The implications for policy of the historical analysis of the establishment of the CIC legal structure are twofold. The analysis demonstrates how practitioner influence can be usefully brought to bear on policy development. Further, that such influence can directed at benefiting societal interests, and not simply advancing narrow organizational interests. Finally, the CIC legal structure created an institutionally-sanctioned and legitimised brand identity for social enterprise (Lloyd, 2010). The development of the historical account uncovered the role of social entrepreneurs in creating the CIC and sheds light on how practitioners might better succeed at influencing policy. While practitioners may lack resources and legitimacy to achieve policy change directly, their influence can be expressed through a collaborative approach in which agency is distributed between actor groups depending on their respective expertise and legitimacy.

Conclusion
The analysis of the structural diversification of the UK social economy demonstrates how a new legal structure for organizations that trade for public benefit was produced from a hybrid of company and charity law. The social enterprise practitioners, lawyers, civil servants and politicians employ their respective expertise and legitimacy to create, refine and enact the legislation. Selected characteristics from extant legal structures were combined, and others categorically rejected, demonstrating how social economy structural diversification occurred by increasing organizational form variety.
	The CIC legislation was enacted at a time when New Labour discourse applied the language of community as an emollient to policies to outsource public service delivery and devolve to neighbourhoods the responsibility for economic and social regeneration (Amin, 2005). As communities increasingly became involved in “projects of regulation, reform and mobilization” (Rose, 1996, p. 334), the establishment of the CIC bound together the languages of ‘community’ and ‘commerce’ but at the same time left open to specification the definitions of community, assets and community interests and remained silent on the commercial risks associated with trading for public benefit. 
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